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Religious Liberty in Pakistan: Law, Reality, and 
Perception (A Brief Synopsis) 
Farooq Hassan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
In order to understand the current status of religious liberty in 
Pakistan, it is helpful to look at the major laws that bear on the issue. 
These laws include Pakistan’s constitutional law as well as various 
statutory provisions of Pakistan’s Penal Code. An analysis of these 
two sets of laws will enable one to fully realize whether religious lib-
erty exists and, if so, the extent to which it is available in contempo-
rary Pakistan.2 Prior to this analysis, a brief look at the background of 
Pakistan’s legal system will be useful. 
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION 
A. Laws of the British Period 
Many countries of the present day Commonwealth, including 
Pakistan, inherited the corpus juris of statutory rules and jurispru-
dence devised and enforced by the British during the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century. Initially created for India, these laws were 
 
 ∗ D.Phil.; BA Juris., MA, M.LiTT (Oxon); DCL (Columbia); DIA (Harvard); Of 
Lincoln’s Inn; Barrister at Law; Senior Advocate S.C. (QC) Pakistan; Attorney at Law (U.S.). 
The author served as a professor of law and foreign affairs and as an advisor to four Prime 
Ministers and governments in Pakistan. Mr. Hassan has also represented Pakistan many times 
at the United Nations in New York and before the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.  
 1. The substance of this paper was presented at the Eighth Annual International Law 
and Religion Symposium, “Implementing the 1981 U.N. Declaration on Religious Tolerance 
and Non-Discrimination: Twenty Years of Experience,” Brigham Young University, J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, Oct. 7–10, 2001 (on file with the BYU International Center for Law & 
Religion Studies, Provo, Utah 84602). 
 2. There are other areas in which the “Islamization” of laws exists (since pre-
independence time) or has occurred in Pakistan (particularly in the 1980s during General Zia’s 
presidency) and to which there is a reference in Chapter 11 of my work, FAROOQ HASSAN, 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMY 264–304 (1984). However, this pa-
per will focus on the two articulated categories of laws: the law of the constitution and the ap-
plicable criminal statutory provisions. 
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later implemented in other parts of the Empire and included codified 
forms of the common law of England in diverse fields such as crimi-
nal law, criminal procedure, and evidence.3 
The codification of English common law in India was easy 
enough, but its implementation proved difficult as British jurists at-
tempted to apply their own rules to an environment comprised of 
many diverse faiths. The challenge was to give equal and uniform 
treatment to respective religious laws. With no available precedent 
from England, this change required innovation. 
As such, the religious doctrines of different faiths found statutory 
recognition and enforcement for the adherents of the relevant faiths 
in matters of personal law under the newly formed laws. Distinct 
laws governing activities such as marriage, divorce, adoption, trusts, 
and religious customs were made available to the followers of differ-
ent religious faiths in accordance with their respective faith. Thus, 
Christian personal laws only applied to Christians, and the Muslim or 
Hindu personal laws only applied to followers of those religions.4 
This type of system was necessary since British India had millions of 
followers of every major religion. 
During British rule, the constitutional law of India did not di-
rectly deal with freedom of religion, as the provincial (or state) laws 
were devised to reach this result. However, the Indian Penal law, 
codified and enforced by federal law, did contain several provisions 
on this subject. Pakistan has kept these Indian Penal laws largely in-
tact since it gained independence in 1947. These laws are contained 
in Chapter XV of Pakistan’s Penal Code.5 
 
 3. The INDIAN PEN. CODE (1860); Indian Evidence Act (1872), in M. MONIR, 
PRINCIPLES AND DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: BEING A COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN 
EVIDENCE ACT (I OF 1872); and INDIAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1898) are all considered 
masterpieces of drafting. 
 4. For example, if a Christian couple desired to be married, compliance with the spe-
cific marriage rules of their own sect was all that was necessary to achieve state recognition of 
the marriage. 
 5. PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 15. The original offenses under this statute included blas-
phemy and desecration of places of religious worship. See id. §§ 295, 295C. To a Westerner, 
such “wrongs” may seem arcane, but it should be kept in mind that Pakistan is an Islamic 
State. See PAK. CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) [hereinafter 14 
CONSTITUTIONS]. Over 97% of Pakistan’s population is Muslim. The statutory additions to 
Pakistan’s Penal Code are therefore intended to protect or encourage the majority faith. 
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B. Pakistani Independence and Constitutional Foundations 
1. Pakistan gains independence 
In the spring of 1940, in Lahore, Mohammad Ali Jinnah intro-
duced a resolution for the division of British India.6 After two dec-
ades of failed attempts by Jinnah to unite the Hindu and Muslim 
communities, the “Lahore Resolution” finally called for a separate 
Muslim state.7 The independent state of Pakistan was the result. On 
August 14, 1947, Jinnah was sworn in as Pakistan’s first governor-
general, and, though seventy years old and suffering from tuberculo-
sis, Jinnah zealously began creating an infrastructure for the new 
country.8 
Though Pakistan was created specifically for Muslims, Jinnah 
continued to proclaim tolerance for all religions.9 This pluralistic sen-
timent became canonized in the 1949 “Objectives Resolution,” 
which was created to provide guidance to the drafters of Pakistan’s 
first constitution.10 It states, in part: 
Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and 
collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of 
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran (sic) and Sunna; . . . [and] ade-
quate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess 
and practise their religion’s (sic) and develop their cultures . . . .11 
 
 
 6. See SHAHID JAVED BURKI, PAKISTAN: FIFTY YEARS OF NATIONHOOD 1 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 23–24. 
 9. See David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 27, 
27 (1994). Jinnah explained to the Constituent Assembly in 1947: 
 [Y]ou are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or, to any 
other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or 
caste or creed—that has got nothing to do with the business of the State. . . . We are 
all starting with this fundamental principle that we are citizens and equal citizens of 
one State. 
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1042–43 (1991) (cit-
ing ISHTIAQ AHMED, THE CONCEPT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
IDEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY IN PAKISTAN 79 (1987)). 
 10. See S.M. Zafar, Constitutional Development, in PAKISTAN: FOUNDERS’ ASPIRATIONS 
AND TODAY’S REALITIES 30, 31–32 (Hafeez Malik ed., 2001). 
 11. Forte, supra note 9, at 30–31 (citing Objectives Resolution (1949), in SAFDAR 
MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTAN 46 (2d rev. ed. 1990)). 
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The guidance of the Objectives Resolution was followed by the 
constitutional drafters, and in 1956, the first Pakistani Constitution 
came into being. 
2. Religious freedom under the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions 
The preamble to the 1956 Constitution included the tenets set 
forth in the Objectives Resolution seven years earlier. The preamble 
asserted that Pakistan was “based on Islamic principles of social jus-
tice,”12 guaranteed Muslim life “in accordance with the teachings 
and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah,”13 and prohibited any laws “repugnant” to Islam as set forth 
in the Quran and Sunnah.14 The preamble also provided that “ade-
quate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and 
practise their religions and develop their cultures.”15 These general 
principles were then broken out into specific religious rights in Arti-
cle 18 of the Constitution.16 
Nonetheless, the 1956 Constitution was short lived. Following a 
1958 military coup under General Muhammad Ayub Khan, a new 
constitution came into being as part of the restoration to civilian 
rule. Though the 1962 Constitution established several Islamic insti-
tutions, it gave them no real legislative power.17 Further, two por-
tions of the 1956 preamble were notably missing from the 1962 ver-
sion: the repugnancy clause and any references to “Quran and 
Sunnah.”18 Shortly thereafter, however, even though General Khan 
staffed the newly formed Islamic institutions with secularists, intense 
pressure from Islamists forced a 1964 constitutional amendment.19 
 
 12. Id. at 32 (citing PAK. CONST. of 1956 pmbl., in MAHMOOD supra note 11, at 
247). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. Constitutional references to Quran and Sunnah, rather than to Sharia, were 
significant in that they emphasized the Muslim, as opposed to Islamic, character of Pakistan. 
Such constitutional references were aimed at placing authority to create and interpret law in 
the secular parliament and courts rather than in Islamic jurists. This was necessary since there 
was, and still is today, much tension between Islam and religious minorities under traditional 
Sharia. See id. at 33–34. 
 15. Id. at 33 (citing PAK. CONST. of 1956 pmbl., in MAHMOOD, supra note 11, at 
247). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 34. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
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The amendment reinstated the repugnancy clause and added an ad-
ditional phrase stating, “[N]o law shall be repugnant to the teach-
ings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah, and all existing laws shall be brought into conformity 
therewith.”20 This additional phrase introduced a way to enforce the 
repugnancy clause and was the first of many steps taken by Islamists 
to Islamicize Pakistan.21 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PAKISTAN 
The foundation for Pakistan’s current Constitution was created 
in 1973. After a second period of martial law, a civil war, and the 
separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the 1973 Constitution was 
implemented as part of a new civilian government.22 
A. The 1973 Constitution 
The 1973 Constitution reflects the steady influence Islamists 
have had on the legal and political spheres in Pakistan.23 It was the 
first constitution to formally establish Islam as the state religion in 
Pakistan.24 The 1973 Constitution also retained the retroactive 
clause of the 1962 Constitution requiring “all existing laws [to] be 
brought into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam” and created 
the Council of Islamic Ideology to enforce implementation of the 
clause.25 Articles 2, 20, and 31 of the 1973 Constitution also discuss 
aspects of religious freedom. 
Article 2 expressly states, “Islam shall be the State religion of 
Pakistan.”26 Article 31, which appears in Chapter 2 of the Constitu-
tion and is entitled “Principles of Policy,” contains a mandate to 
 
 20. Id. (citing PAK. CONST. of 1962 amended by First Amend., Act 1 of 1964, in 
MAHMOOD, supra note 11, at 628, 634) (emphasis added). 
 21. See generally RUBYA MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN (1994); 
HASSAN, supra note 2. 
 22. See Forte, supra note 9, at 35. 
 23. See generally MEHDI, supra note 21; HASSAN, supra note 2. 
 24. See PAK. CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. In fact, 
some scholars suggest this is one of the main reasons for the survival of the 1973 Constitution. 
See Zafar, supra note 10, at 49. 
 25. Forte, supra note 9, at 36 (citing PAK. CONST. arts. 227–30, in MAHMOOD, supra 
note 11, at 956–58). 
 26. PAK. CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. 
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comprehensively adopt the Islamic way of life for Muslims.27 The 
provisions of this Chapter are not binding on the courts but provide 
guidelines for policy-oriented decisions of all state functionaries.28 
Article 20 of the 1973 Constitution contains the following major 
provision on religious freedom: “Subject to law, public order and 
morality,—(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise 
and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and 
every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and 
manage its religious institutions.”29 
Two points need immediate attention. First, Article 20(a) is ex-
pressly available only to “citizens” of Pakistan. Second, this is a “con-
stitutional right,” yet it is “subject to law.” This signifies that sub-
constitutional legislation, for reasons of “public morality” or “public 
order,” may regulate this right. In theory, the practice of every relig-
ion, including Islam, is subject to this provision. But case law indi-
cates that these “restrictions” have only been applied to the time, 
place, and manner of certain religious celebrations. More often than 
not, such restrictions have been applied to Muslims who belong to 
certain sects. As such, it can be asserted that this provision has gener-
ally not been utilized to the detriment of the non-Muslim minorities. 
But does a “foreigner” have no such right? The answer seems to 
lie in the jurisprudence of Article 20(b). The followers of every relig-
ion, whether or not they are citizens, are “constitutionally” free and 
“authorized” to set up and propagate their faith. However, the “es-
tablishment” and “management” of these religions seem to be “sub-
ject to law.” This provision applies to Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. Thus, it appears that religious liberty to practice and profess 
one’s religion is available to both citizens and foreigners in Paki-
stan.30 
Under Article 20, freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere 
to any religion or form of worship that an individual may choose 
 
 27. See id. art. 31; see also discussion infra Section III.A. 
 28. Article 31 further explains that steps shall be taken to enable Muslims in Pakistan, 
individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles 
and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities that would enable them to understand the 
meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. See PAK. CONST. art. 31, reprinted 
in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. 
 29. Id. art. 20. 
 30. Compare this provision to Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution, which es-
sentially provide the same protections. However, this position is not parsi pasu with Pakistan as 
explained supra. 
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cannot be restricted by law. The phrase “subject to law” does not in-
vest the legislature with unlimited power to impinge upon this con-
stitutional right. Lawmakers can act only in limited circumstances, 
which must pertain to “public order” and “morality.” The “subject 
to law” clause is essentially a regulatory power that must be exercised 
for a permissible end. This provision seems to be in harmony with 
similar provisions from other state constitutions that deal with the 
time and place of worship and the manner of soliciting and holding 
public meetings. It should also be noted that in order to safeguard 
peace, order, and comfort of the community, the government could 
legitimately undertake regulation of religious practices.31 
It is incorrect to say that religion is nothing more than a set of 
beliefs. Religion includes certain practices as well as beliefs, and the 
Constitution protects such actions.32 This constitutional protection 
covers all practices that are regarded by a particular religious com-
munity to be a part of their faith. As long as such religious practices 
are “well established,” they will prevail over any general law that ap-
pears contrary to such practices.33 This line of reasoning appears to 
“protect” practices such as polygamy and other practices that are 
sanctioned by clear religious doctrine.34 In Pakistan, similar results 
have been reached. For example, Section 30 of the 1984 Punjab Or-
dinance VIII prohibited the Shia community from conducting cer-
tain religious processions because the processions were held to be 
against “public order.”35 Both the supreme court and the Lahore 
High Court struck down the ordinance as being ultra vires of Article 
20 of the Constitution.36 
 
 31. The approach to what the legislature can do under the cloak of such regulatory 
power has been dealt with differently by the United States Supreme Court, the Indian Su-
preme Court (Apex Court), and some decisions in Pakistan. The United States Supreme Court 
held that laws are made for the government of “actions,” and while these actions cannot inter-
fere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may interfere with practices that are contrary 
to the general law of the land. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). On the 
other hand, the Indian Supreme Court held that a religion undoubtedly has its basis in a sys-
tem of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess them to be conducive to 
their personal and spiritual well-being. See A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282. 
 32. See A.I.R. 1954 SC 282. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See 1985 P.L.D. S.C. 8; 1992 P.L.D. Lah.l. 
 36. See 1985 P.L.D. S.C. 8; 1992 P.L.D. Lah.l. 
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B. The Impact of India’s Constitution on Pakistan 
In order to further understand Pakistan’s position on religious 
liberty, it is helpful to review the corresponding constitutional posi-
tion in India. Article 25 of the Indian Constitution reads as follows: 
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND FREE PROFESSION, PRACTICE AND 
PROPAGATION OF RELIGION—Subject to public order, morality and 
health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are 
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely 
profess, practise and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing 
law or prevent the State from making any law— 
 (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or 
other secular activity which may be associated with religious prac-
tice; 
 (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open 
of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes 
and sections of Hindus. 
Explanation I—The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be 
deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.37 
The essential difference between Article 25 of the Indian Consti-
tution and the corresponding provision in Pakistan’s Constitution is 
that the former applies to all persons, not merely citizens, whereas 
the latter applies only to citizens. Further, Article 25 of the Indian 
Constitution specifically provides protection for traditions and cus-
toms of the two major historical components of the Indian religious 
society, the Hindus and Sikhs, qua their main religious doctrines, 
which may be manifested by overt actions. 
Article 26 of the Indian Constitution reads as follows: 
FREEDOM TO MANAGE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS—Subject to public or-
der, morality and health, every religious denomination or any sec-
tion thereof shall have the right— 
 
 37. INDIA CONST. art. 25, reprinted in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1997). 
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(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable 
purposes; 
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.38 
Article 26 appears to be more exhaustive than the corresponding 
provision in Pakistan’s Constitution. In particular, Article 26 protects 
“religious affairs” that a community regards as essential for matters 
of faith or those practices that are generally considered to be an inte-
gral part of religion. 
In sum, India’s constitutional position regarding religious beliefs, 
even when pertaining to overt actions, is that freedom of religion will 
be protected. This freedom will be protected even if it is contrary to 
the secular law of the land as long as its usage is established and as 
long as the religion has, prima facie, the consent of the parties af-
fected and the consent of the community. This is particularly true of 
many of the practices affecting the personal laws of the major relig-
ions that exist in India and Pakistan today. 
However, “reformative” measures devised by the government 
that do not satisfy the element of “established usage” in either Paki-
stan or India have, of late, been protected by the courts. In India, at-
tacks on the Hindu Marriages Act aimed at social welfare of the 
community were repelled. In Pakistan, challenges to the 1961 Mus-
lim Family Laws Ordinance failed because stringent procedural re-
quirements imposed on second marriages were held to be valid and 
not affected by the Constitution.39 Based on these results, it seems 
that the legislature is perhaps best suited to promote public good by 
effecting changes in religious practices. 
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER PAKISTAN’S PENAL CODE 
Pakistan’s Penal Code contains several sections that are relevant 
to this discussion.40 The original Penal Code, drafted by the British, 
 
 38. Id. art. 26. 
 39. See A.I.R. 1952 Bom.; A.I.R. 1961 All. 335; 1989 P.L.D. Kar. 513. 
 40. These are Sections 295, 295A, 295B, 295C, 296, 297, 298, 298A, 298B, and 
298C. Section 295A was added by Ordinance XXI of 1991. Section 295B was added by Ordi-
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contained four sections (Sections 295 through 298) that dealt with 
religious liberty. The remaining sections were added by amendment 
during General Zia’s military rule in the 1980s. The sections added 
through November 1985 were added during a period of Martial 
Law, while the other sections were subsequently introduced by the 
civilian government that later came into existence under the same 
General Zia. 
Before analyzing these diverse provisions, it is helpful to list what 
they contain: 
(1) Section 295. Injuring or defiling places of worship with in-
tent to insult the religion of any class: Punishment—two years. 
(2) Section 295A. Deliberate/malicious acts that outrage reli-
gious feelings of others: Punishment—ten years. 
(3) Section 295B. Defiling the Holy Quran: Punishment—
imprisonment for life. 
(4) Section 295C. Use of derogatory remarks with respect to the 
Holy Prophet: Punishment—death or imprisonment for life. 
(5) Section 296. Disturbing religious assembly: Punishment—
one year. 
(6) Section 297. Trespassing or indignity upon burial places: 
Punishment—one year. 
(7) Section 298. Uttering words that injure religious feelings: 
Punishment—one year. 
(8) Section 298A. Using derogatory remarks about holy person-
ages: Punishment—three years. 
(9) Section 298B. Misuse of epithets or titles of holy people: 
Punishment—three years. 
(10) Section 298C. Persons of Qadiani (Ahmadi) Group claim-
ing to be Muslim: Punishment—three years. 
It is immediately apparent that while some of these offenses are 
for the protection of every faith, those sections introduced during 
the 1980s are for the exclusive benefit of the Islamic faith. This 
should not seem strange since the Constitution itself declares Paki-
 
nance I of 1982. Section 295C was added by Act III of 1986. Section 298A was added by Or-
dinance XLIV of 1980. Section 298C was added by Ordinance XX of 1984: Anti-Islamic Ac-
tivities of Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordi-
nance, 1984, 36 P.L.D. 102 (1984) (Pak.) (as cited in Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion 
& Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 40 
n.9 (1995)). 
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stan to be an Islamic Republic.41 Furthermore, Article 31 of Paki-
stan’s Constitution declares that: 
(1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, indi-
vidually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the 
fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide 
facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning 
of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 
(2) The State shall endeavour, as respects the Muslims of Paki-
stan,— 
(a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compul-
sory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language 
and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy 
Quran; 
(b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral stan-
dards; and 
(c) to secure the proper organisation of zakat, [ushr,] auqaf and 
mosques.42 
Given the historical background of Pakistan’s creation, the raison 
d’être of having such provisions is understandable. Since Pakistan’s 
creation, political parties and religious groups have insisted on creat-
ing a state system based on Islamic heritage. Generally speaking, the 
religious elements have never had any degree of apparent success in 
any electoral process. Secular parties have triumphed in every elec-
tion in Pakistan since its creation. Yet, the public philosophy of the 
country is such that, at least rhetorically, even the accepted secular 
leadership of the country has found it impossible to deny the applica-
tion of this volkgeist. For example, the basis of Section 298C of the 
Penal Code is the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which 
declared the Qadiani sect as non-Muslims.43 This alteration took 
place in September 1974, when the highest civilian leadership of the 
 
 41. See discussion supra Part III.A. Article 2 of Pakistan’s Constitution states that “Islam 
shall be the State religion of Pakistan.” PAK. CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 5. 
 42. PAK. CONST. art. 31, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. 
 43. PAK. CONST. art. 260, cl. 3, amended by Second Amend., Act 49 of 1974, reprinted 
in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. 
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country was vested in Bhutto, otherwise well known for his secular 
and, indeed, socialist leanings. 
History seems to indicate that the pressure on the government 
by the poor masses is so overwhelming that the nation’s leaders often 
use the shelter of Islam to fend it off. This device generates a cycle of 
dynamics that then produces a qualitative status of its own. The peo-
ple are told that as Muslims they must suffer for the betterment of 
the state. The mullahs, paid by the government, are a major vehicle 
for the dissemination of this social milieu. 
This should not be taken to mean, however, that genuine reli-
gious parties have nothing to add here. While performing with only 
marginal success in the countrywide elections, these religious parties 
do possess, nevertheless, powerful local and regional bases. For ex-
ample, the Jamiat-e-Islami and other similar parties have genuine na-
tional credentials. Above all, their followers are very committed and 
vocal in public gatherings. The inevitable result is that even while not 
in power, their basic messages are often incorporated into legislation 
and are considered in major state actions. 
Without undue emphasis, it is also necessary to say that since the 
Soviet expulsion from Afghanistan in the 1980s there has been a 
steep upsurge in conservative thinking about Islamic teachings in this 
region. Whether this is “fundamentalism” in the sense in which 
Western contemporary writers use the term is not relevant for this 
analysis. It is, however, important to keep this factor in mind and to 
remember the implications associated with it. 
In a sense, this rise in ideological fervor occurred with abundant 
Western psychological, material, and media help. The motivation at 
that time was to utilize this kind of overpowering, emotive zeal to 
demolish the theoretical basis of Communist ideology, which had 
bogged down Western nations for nearly half a century. The Muslim 
“zealots” were hailed as “Mujahadeen,” or freedom fighters of God. 
Now, the circumstances have changed. The very same Mujahadeen 
are now being called upon to take a new look at the entire meaning 
and basis of life. Apparently, this is not an easy task. 
The present position of religious freedom in Pakistan can be 
properly comprehended only in the context and framework of these 
fundamental legal postulates and realities. The larger part of the cor-
pus of the law, both in the fields of constitutional and criminal law, is 
of routine and secular legal format, content, and implication. Paki-
stan’s judicial branch, especially at the level of the high courts and 
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the supreme court, has rendered sound and progressive interpreta-
tions that have given rise to situations in which minorities often have 
little to complain about. 
Still, the major critics contend that religious freedom is less than 
what it should be under established constitutional44 and international 
guidelines.45 Three such contentions may be summarized as follows: 
(1) the declaration of Qadinais as non-Muslims; (2) the declaration 
of the state as Islamic, making it ex hypothesi, religious in nature; and 
(3) the wide-state patronage to Muslim institutions as compared to 
non-Muslim establishments. 
It is not necessary to deal with these issues separately, since once 
it is accepted that Pakistan is constitutionally an “Islamic Republic,” 
the extent to which the state visibly and manifestly leans towards Is-
lam becomes inevitable. Nevertheless, because minority religions, as 
such, are not adversely affected directly in their own spheres of activ-
ity, there is no real intrusion. Furthermore, “equal opportunity” for 
Muslims and non-Muslims is evidenced by the fact that Pakistan has 
both a Federal Ministry of Auqaf and Haj for Muslims and a Ministry 
of Minorities, invariably headed by a Minister who is either Christian 
or Hindu. 
Pakistan’s Penal Code has received its share of criticisms as well. 
Most of this criticism has been directed at those sections of the code 
that became law during the 1980s—Sections 295A, 295B, 295C, 
298A, 298B, and 298C. Although there are divergent views on the 
desirability of these laws, it is clear that they are designed to uphold 
the sanctity of the Islamic doctrinaire structure. 
The most controversial section in this respect is Section 295C. 
Under this section, an offender may be punished with death or life-
 
 44. For major constitutional provisions generally cited for creating such a regime, see, 
e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; VA. CONST. § 58, pt. 1; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1992) § 
1; THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN arts. 18 and 
19; and GREECE CONST. art. 13. 
 45. For international standards, see, e.g. Declaration on Religious Freedom—Dignitatis 
Humanae, Promulgated by Pope Paul VI (Dec. 7, 1965), available at 
http://www.cin.org/v2relfre.html; Declaration of the Parliament of the World Religions 
(Sept. 4, 1993); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (en-
tered into force Jan. 3, 1976) arts. 2, 13.1, 13.3; Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A. 
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) arts. 2.l, 2.21, 4.l, 
14.3, 20.l, 20.3, 29.l, 30; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opended for 
signature Dec. 19, 2966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, arts. 2.1, 4.1, 18.l, 18.2, l8.3, 18.4, 20.2, 26.2. 
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time imprisonment if it is proved that he used derogatory language 
toward or regarding the Holy Prophet Muhammad.46 Critics of this 
section focus on the severe quantum of punishment. They argue that 
capital punishment is not commensurate with the “violation” in-
volved. On the other hand, proponents argue that the purpose of the 
penal law is to preserve public order by mandating retribution for 
any act that grievously injures the religious feelings of a large class or 
community. Those in that class or community, it is argued, should 
be saved from gross injury perceived to occur by such outrageous ac-
tions.47 Therefore, this argument continues, Section 295C is meant 
to prevent situations that could potentially wreck havoc on the law 
and order of any particular locality. However, when enforcing such 
provisions, the courts must be very circumspect and ensure that the 
religious emotions of different classes of the community, whether or 
not they reflect the majority perspective, are not hurt.48 
Pakistan’s case law on this issue is less than clear, making it diffi-
cult to say whether a certain philosophy is evolving. In a number of 
cases involving the Ahmadis, the courts have held that Section 295C 
must be narrowly construed and its consequences strictly applied.49 
However, in these same cases, the minimum punishment available 
has actually been given. It appears that the judiciary is aware of the 
potential misuse of this law, and it has attempted to progressively 
approach the matter in a “liberal” manner as far as the punishment is 
concerned. Nevertheless, in upholding the scope of the content of 
this provision, judges have generally followed the trend of the legis-
lature. In other cases involving the Ahmadis, the attempt to compare 
Mirza Ghulum Ahmad to the Holy Prophet Muhammad has been 
found to be punishable under Section 295C.50 In contrast, in several 
leading cases involving Christians, the accused have been set free, in-
variably by a finding of insufficient proof. One such case drew inter-
national attention when the Lahore High Court acquitted the ac-
 
 46. See PAK. PEN. CODE § 295C. 
 47. See 1976 P. Cr. L.J. 1456 Lah. 
 48. See 1958 A.I.R. S.C. 1032. 
 49. See 1992 Lah. P.L.D.1; Zaheeruddin v. State, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) 1718 (1993) 
(Pak.). For discussions of Zaheeruddin v. State, see Mahmud, supra note 40; M. Nadeem 
Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and the Official Persecution of the 
Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. 275 (1995). 
 50. See, e.g., 1995 N.L.R. S.D. 217 (FB); Zaheeruddin v. State, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) 
1718 (1993) (Pak.); 1992 Lah. P.L.D.1. 
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cused, and then shortly thereafter, the Senior Judge was murdered in  
his office.51 The other judge that decided the case reportedly fled to 
the United States on an immigrant visa. 
It appears that the prosecution will generally follow the public 
mood, particularly if the locality is rural. The trial courts prefer to do 
the same, while the higher courts tend to quash such proceedings. It 
should also be mentioned that this law has not merely been used 
against non-Muslims; Muslims have also been accused and prose-
cuted under Section 295C. As recently as September 8, 2001, four 
Muslims were prosecuted in Karachi for using the Holy Prophet’s 
name on their shop sign. The shop owner’s neighbors noticed the 
sign and brought the local police to the shop; the police determined 
that the sign was in derogation of supreme respect for the Prophet. 
V. REALITIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS  
FREEDOM IN PAKISTAN 
A. Realities 
As the majority of legal provisions dealing with religious liberty 
have been presented, it is necessary to turn to an evaluation of the 
basic realities that exist in Pakistan under the current statutory re-
gime. 
Two preliminary points may immediately be noted. First, the 
greater part of the law, which arguably offends the notions of “reli-
gious liberty,” is the product of only the last twenty years. This is es-
sentially the period in which Pakistan, with the approval of the inter-
national community, became the home of the Mujahadeen. Second, 
although religious freedom cases produce considerable furor and 
publicity in Pakistan, the accused tend to be acquitted by the higher 
courts. In other words, the potential use or misuse of these laws pri-
marily occurs in rural and far-flung areas of the country. Fearing re-
prisals, local judges usually do not even attempt to approach the 
matter with unbiased minds. However, at the appeals stage, most of 
these cases are quashed, as it is generally understood that criminal 
law should not use these cases as the vehicle for enforcing religious 
sensitivities. 
These realities immediately lead one to realize that the funda-
 
 51. See Salamat Masih v. The State, 1995 P. Cr. L.J. 811 (1995). 
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mental danger to the accused under Pakistan’s Constitution and Pe-
nal Code is not the fear of ultimate conviction but that of being in-
carcerated for considerable periods of time without bail. In many of 
these cases, even the higher courts refuse to grant bail during trials. 
This is a considerable hardship for ordinary people in Pakistan, in 
addition to the large legal costs involved with holding a trial.52 
It is also necessary to add that religious prejudices or leanings of 
particular faiths are not only advanced or discouraged through law 
but also through other methods. The impairment or the attempt to 
impinge upon religious expression can often occur without recourse 
to such modalities of law. This phenomenon is the demonstration of 
the voice of the “public,” often by the ill-educated mullah.53 
B. Perceptions 
Along with the realities concerning religious freedom that have 
been discussed, there are several commonly held perceptions about 
Pakistan’s level of religious freedom. First, many believe that Paki-
stan is a country in which the Sharia prevails because Pakistan was 
created for Muslims out of the subcontinent of India and also be-
cause Pakistan has been constitutionally declared an Islamic State. 
This belief is incorrect. Despite recent legislative attempts to Islami-
cize Pakistan, Pakistan remains essentially “secular” in character. 54 
Only this acute realization forces the religious political parties of the 
country to constantly stress that the government is not doing 
enough to achieve the goal of Islamicizing Pakistan. 
Second, despite the efforts of various civilian and military gov-
ernments that appeared to be “Islamic,” the judiciary has steadfastly 
denied the wholesale acceptance of such a legal philosophy.55 Paki-
stani lawyers know this, politicians are aware of this fact, and the 
government is quite satisfied with this state of affairs. These parties 
all seem to silently agree that such a de facto arrangement should 
 
 52. See generally Atta Ullah v. The State, P.L.D. 2000 Lah. 364 (1999); Riaz Ahmad v. 
The State, P.L.D. 1994 Lah. 485 (1994); Salamat Masih v. The State, 1995 P. Cr. L.J. 811 
(1995). 
 53. See generally HASSAN, supra note 2. I have little hesitation in admitting that through 
this “voice” even the majority is threatened. All that is required is the manipulation and the 
ultimate utilization of this process at any given locality. 
 54. See also MEHDI, supra note 21. See generally HASSAN, supra note 2;  
 55. For an excellent review of religious freedom and the Pakistani judiciary, see generally 
Mahmud, supra note 40. 
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continue. The religious parties, also sensing the existence of such a 
“public conspiracy,” continue to shout “foul” but with little affect. 
Third, when political upheavals may be on the horizon or when 
circumstances so warrant, the judicial branch can also go the other 
way in a decisive manner. This is evidenced by some of the major de-
velopments in Pakistan’s constitutional history. The best example of 
this deviation is the recent decision that the Supreme Court’s Shariat 
Bench reached in December 1999 that declared interest as un-
Islamic and void. Under the Constitution, the Shariat Bench ordered 
the Pakistani administration, by June 2001, to amend the laws under 
which interest is permitted. However, this amendment did not oc-
cur, and the Court allowed the government to delay making the 
change while the verdict was on review. Interestingly, the Shariat 
Bench’s Chief Judge was forced into compulsory retirement in Janu-
ary 2000 by the military regime. This demonstrates that, despite rhe-
torical claims, no government of Pakistan has been genuinely “pro-
Islam” as far as its policies are concerned. 
Last, as submitted above, the vehicle for keeping the state “pro-
gressively modern” has been the judiciary, primarily in the penal law 
domain. Yet in a philosophical sense, the judiciary has also been 
keeping the fundamentalists happy. In this vein, the judiciary has 
gone well beyond the interpretations of the United States Supreme 
Court in holding that even overt actions of people under an estab-
lished religious practice contrary to the general law of the land are 
protected under Pakistan’s Constitution.56 
 
 56. See, e.g., 1985 P.L.D. S.C. 8. Dicta in United States cases such as Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939) departed from this belief. The United States Supreme Court 
stated in Cantwell stated that “[f]reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such reli-
gious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by 
law. . . . Thus the [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Con-
duct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Id. at 303–04. 
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